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Saving a victim from himself: the rhetoric of the learner’s presence and 
absence in the Milgram experiments 
 
Dr David Kaposi 
(The Open University) 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper contests what has remained a core assumption in social psychological and general 
understandings of the Milgram experiments.  Analysing the learner/victim’s rhetoric in experimental 
sessions across five conditions (N= 170), it demonstrates that what participants were exposed to was 
not the black-and-white scenario of being pushed towards continuation by the experimental authority 
and pulled towards discontinuation by the learner/victim. Instead, the traditionally posited explicit 
collision of “forces” or “identities” was at all points of the experiments undermined by an implicit 
collusion between them: rendering the learner/victim a divided and contradictory subject, and the 
experimental process a constantly shifting and paradoxical experiential-moral field. As a result, the 
paper concludes that evaluating the participants’ conduct requires an understanding of the 
experiments where morality and non-destructive agency were not simple givens to be applied to a 
transparent case, but had to be re-created anew – in the face not just of their explicit denial by the 
experimenter but also of their implicit denial by the victim.   




Stanley Milgram’s “Obedience to authority” experiments are routinely referred to as being of “glaring 
celebrity status” (Miller, 2009, p. 20) and “part of our society’s intellectual legacy” (Ross & Nisbett, 
1991, p. 55). Indeed, from sources as diverse as academic textbooks and popular cultural products, 
generations are now familiar with the image of the infamous mock learning experiment: unwitting 
experimental participants facing the dilemma of administering possibly lethal electric shocks to a 
“learner” in the adjacent room; and despite ever more vigorous protests, 65% of them proceeding to 
do so on the simple say-so of an experimenter figure present. 
What continues to be less widely known though is that the experimental condition briefly described 
was only one of many Milgram ran. The simple finding that obedience to an authority figure is more 
widespread than would be expected was always intended to be Milgram’s most important message. 
But it was never meant to be the only message. Milgram also wanted to uncover the characteristics 
of the two sets of factors which his situational explanation posited to underlie behavioural 
(dis)obedience: one “binding” the participants into the experiment, and the other constituting  
“strain” on their participation and prompting them to quit (Milgram, 1963, 1965). To this end, a total 
of eighteen conditions of the experiments were devised, varying for example the type of protest 
coming from the victim, the distance between the “teacher” and the “learner”, the roles deployed in 
the scenario, or introducing group processes (for overviews, see Milgram, 1974; Miller, 1986).1 
Examining five of these conditions, the present paper will look at two broad categories of the 
experiments. First, it will examine Conditions 2, 8 and 23, where interaction between the 
teacher/participant and the learner was “interrupted” by the wall of the room.2 Condition 2 is the 
basic set-up already summarised above: the learner/victim is situated in an adjacent room, with 
communication happening through an intercom and protests being heard through the wall. Conditions 
 
1 For a further, unpublished, condition, see Rochat and Modigliani (1997) and Perry (2012). 
2 Some of the experimental conditions were renumbered for the publication of Milgram (1974). See Table 1 
below for details. 
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8 and 23 are two of the closest variations of the basic set-up. Condition 8 features the learner referring 
to a heart complaint he has and establishing in the pre-experimental routine that he may quit the 
experiment if he chooses to. Condition 23 too involves reference to the learner’s heart condition, but 
the main difference here is that the experiment takes place not at Yale University but a nondescript 
office building.  
Second, Conditions 3 and 4 will be analysed. In these so-called “Proximity conditions” Milgram brought 
the learner/victim closer to the action. In Condition 3 experimenter, the teacher and the learner were 
positioned in the same room. In Condition 4, sitting now adjacent to him, the teacher even had to 
put/force the reluctant learner’s hand on the electric plate in order to administer any electric shock 
beyond 150 volts.  
Why are these variants of the “default” experimental set-up important? Milgram was interested in 
the physical closeness between the teacher and the learner as he wanted to know whether distance 
has any significant impact on rates of obedience. Indeed, as can be seen from Table 1 below, it did. 
Yet, symptomatic of the experiments in general as well as of Milgram’s approach, the eye-catching 
findings were not matched by a convincing account for them. Milgram never quite managed to explain 
how exactly this physical proximity may have impacted on the teachers’ conduct.  
From the present perspective, this may partly be because Milgram categorically overlooked the 
interactions in the lab. Words there, for him, were important only inasmuch as they were uttered by 
the teachers/participants and could be taken to simply convey the individual cognitive processes 
linking binding situational factors to behavioural obedience. In contrast, for many social psychologists 
today words in the lab invoke the experimental triad’s co-construction of meaning. And the co-
construction of meaning (or, in short, rhetoric) is important in that it constitutes the very nature of 
the social psychological processes that were happening in Milgram’s lab. Accordingly, the significance 
of the different conditions in which the experiments were run is that they involve different rhetorical 
possibilities within the learner-teacher-experimenter triad.  
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The immediate purpose of the present paper is thus to understand some aspects of the rhetoric of 
Milgram’s lab. However, it is also hoped that the analysis to be presented will not just make a valuable 
contribution to “specialist” discursive-rhetorical inquiries. Co-construction of meaning, after all, is of 
obvious importance to experiential or social identity perspectives on the experiments too – not to 
mention the general issue of the participants’ moral conduct that has kept exercising the public 
imagination for over fifty years now. 
   
2. Departures and continuity: the “second wave” of criticism 
After a relative lull from the mid-1980s, the past fifteen years have seen the lively awakening of novel 
critical perspectives on Milgram’s experiments (cf., Gibson, 2019a, pp. 41-71; Reicher, Haslam & 
Miller, 2014, pp. 394-397). Indeed, genuinely transformative frameworks have been emerging as 
contemporary experiential, discursive-rhetorical and social identity frameworks are changing the ways 
we look at the experiments and human beings’ capacity to commit evil. As such, it is now accepted 
that they constitute a true “second wave” of critical engagements (Author, a; Gibson, 2019a; Haslam 
& Reicher, 2017). 
“Second wave” studies inevitably declare discontinuity from Milgram’s perspective: nowhere more so 
than in inquiries concerned retrospectively with the participants’ perspective (Brannigan et al, 2015). 
In what may be called the “experiential” framework, archival and present-day interview data are used 
to reconstruct the participants’ experiences in Milgram’s lab. A prevalent objective of such studies is 
to demonstrate a gap between what Milgram reported to have done in his experiments and what 
actually had happened there: the inadequate nature of Milgram’s debriefing procedures, his 
dismissive attitude to his participants’ suffering, or his misleadingly selective public reporting of the 
experiments (Nicholson, 2011, 2015; Perry, 2012, 2013; cf., Baumrind, 1964, 2015). Additionally, 
alongside accounts of doubts participants harboured or confusion they had regarding the reality of 
the proceedings, renewed light is cast in experiential studies on the manipulative/deceptive means 
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whereby Milgram brought about his “findings” (Perry, 2012; cf., Hollander & Turowetz, 2017; Russell, 
2011, 2018).  
Thus, similar to ethical and methodological reactions that traditionally dominated the reaction to 
Milgram’s work (Miller, 1986), this line of radical interrogation renders the significance of the 
experiments null and void on Milgram’s own terms (Brannigan et al, 2015). They are not any more 
indictments on Milgram’s participants or humanity. It is instead the experiments’ moral legitimacy and 
Milgram’s moral conduct that is in focus (Nicholson, 2011, 2015). 
Other “second wave” critics stand for methodological or epistemological discontinuity. They focus on 
features of the interactions between the experimenter and the participant, duly reported by Milgram 
yet traditionally taken to simply represent intra-subjective thought processes pertaining to 
participants’ (dis)obedience (e.g., Milgram, 1974, pp. 73-76). In contrast, contemporary researchers 
study in their own rights the dynamics of argumentation between the experimenter and the teacher, 
or repertoires of discursive/argumentative characteristics offered by (dis)obedient teachers (Gibson, 
2013a, 2013b, 2014, 2017, 2019a, 2019b; Hollander, 2015; Hollander & Maynard, 2016; Hollander & 
Turowetz, 2017).  
Doing so, this discursive-rhetorical framework offers yet another image of the “obedience 
experiments” that is radically different from the received one. As the focus is on interaction and 
argumentation, what is unfolding is something that is not quite an experiment and not quite about 
obedience(-traditionally-understood) (Gibson, 2013a). Instead, as the participants are “engaging the 
experimenter in rational debate, the experiments begin to look […] more like a contest of persuasion 
and a test of rhetorical skill” (Gibson, 2014, pp. 434-43; cf., Gibson, 2013a, p. 298). Acts of “obedience” 
thus appear not as submissions to orders but defeats in broadly understood argumentative battles 
(Gibson, 2019a, 2019b; Hollander & Maynard, 2016). 
The starting point of the third and arguably most comprehensive framework of the “second wave” is 
a similar understanding of experimental participants actively contributing to the proceedings. In 
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successive social identity theory-inspired publications Alex Haslam and Steve Reicher successfully 
integrate the first strand’s concern with morality and the second strand’s focus on the interactional 
symmetry between the teacher and the experimenter. The radical point of discontinuity is theoretical 
here. In Milgram’s “agentic state” theory participants’ behaviour represented blind/passive obedience 
to orders from an authority figure and was caused by a cognitive shift whereby participants stopped 
seeing themselves as responsible for their own action (Milgram, 1974, p. 133). In Haslam and Reicher’s 
“engaged followership” model, in contrast, the act of pushing levers derives from participants’ active 
choice of identification with the experimenter and his scientific enterprise (e.g., Haslam & Reicher, 
2012, 2017, 2018; Haslam et al, 2011, 2014, 2015; Reicher & Haslam, 2011; Reicher et al, 2011, 2012, 
2014; cf., Russell, 2011, 2014, 2018). 
No wonder that in Haslam and Reicher’s framework the image of the experiments, as well as the 
implicit verdict on humanity, is even more damning than in Milgram’s. Participants here are no 
powerless “cogs” in the face of an authority, or grey bureaucrats “blithely” accepting their tasks 
(Milgram, 1965, p. 61). They are instead “prepared to harm others because they identify with their 
leaders’ cause and believe their actions to be virtuous” (Haslam & Reicher, 2017, p. 59). They make 
choices and are, to use Haslam and Reicher’s chilling quote, “happy to have been of service” (Haslam 
et al, 2015). 
We thus have three radical departures from Milgram and three radically different pictures of the 
“experiments”: one grounded in the participants’ experience and focusing on the experiment’s moral 
legitimacy; one grounded in the participants’ discourse and focusing on arguments and persuasion; 
and one grounded in the participants’ agency and focusing on their identifications. However, the main 
argument of this paper is that these radical departures need to be even further extended. At present, 
Milgram’s arguably most fundamental assumption remains uncontested by the “second wave” too, 
and as such continues to structure our understanding of the experiments. 
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Namely, Milgram’s original assumption that participants faced “the competing demands of two 
persons: the experimenter and the victim” (1963, p. 378; cf., 1965, p. 67) continues to be posited. For 
instance, Haslam and Reicher repeatedly state that “[Milgram’s] participants are torn between 
different relationships, different obligations, different moralities” (Reicher & Haslam, 2011, p. 165; cf., 
Haslam & Reicher, 2018, p. 3; Reicher et al, 2012, pp. 317-318).  Where their theoretical departure 
originates is precisely that they take “engaged followership” theory to do “justice to the tension 
between voices” (Reicher et al, 2012, p. 319), whereas “agentic state” theory “reduces a multi-vocal 
context to a univocal one” (Haslam & Reicher, 2018, p. 2). Such clear-cut conflict, resulting from 
“competing demands” or “different moralities”, remains equally integral to the experiential 
framework, albeit with the image of an all-powerful or even sadistic experimenter (Nicholson, 2011, 
p. 754). And it is either explicitly posited (Hollander, 2015, p. 426) or implicitly assumed by proponents 
of the discursive-rhetorical paradigm too (Gibson, 2013a, 2019a). 
This notion of “competing demands” or “different moralities” suggests a fundamental and 
fundamentally uncomplicated moral choice. As such, it represents not a simple assumption but the 
basic organising framework continuing to underpin the experiments’ meaning and significance 
(Zimbardo, 1974). It is therefore crucial to realise that this fundamental assumption of a black-and-
white moral field leaves something highly important uncontested. Whilst volumes have been written 
about different aspects of the figure of the experimenter and the concept of authority it actualised, 
there is scarcely any corresponding engagement with how the figure of the learner/victim represented 
the pole of morality. 
As of now, in convergence again between past and present critical perspectives, the presence of the 
victim/learner is either simply taken for granted or, in a small minority of publications, dismissed as 
invalid (Mixon, 1972, 1989). Recent work coming from the discursive-rhetorical perspective is a case 
in point. Citing Author (a), Stephen Gibson notes that the learner’s position in the room next door and 
his consequent unavailability for interaction deeply complicates his very role (Gibson, 2019a, pp. 127, 
147). Such acknowledgment is exceptional as far as any “wave” of the Milgram reception is concerned. 
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However, Gibson then proceeds by contrasting this state of affairs with Condition 4 (2019a, pp. 123-
147). And highlighting the heightened persistence and interactional flexibility of learner’s protests, 
alongside both the experimenter’s and the teachers’ engagements with these protests, he then duly 
concludes that “quite simply […] when the learner was in the same room […] he was available for 
consultation and confirmation, and was able to participate in argument” (2019a, p. 146). Thus, just as 
the learner’s problematic engagement is noted, his position as “the learner’s potential ally” is 
immediately re-established (Idem). 
The present paper will come to different conclusions not just from what has always been a simple 
assumption in the Milgram literature but also from Gibson’s fine-grained empirical analysis. It will 
demonstrate that, throughout all conditions, the victim/learner’s interactional engagement as the 
teacher’s potential ally was co-existent with his simultaneous disengagement from, and even on 
occasion hostile engagement with, the teacher/participant. And consequently, in contrast to the 
received picture where it is the learner’s unequivocal clash with the experimenter that constitutes the 
moral field, the present paper will reveal a paradoxical mixture of collision and collusion: implicit 
alliance as much as explicit opposition. The experimental participants’ moral responsibility will 
therefore have to be (re)considered by taking this persistent paradoxical ambiguity of the 
experimental context into account.  
 
3. Method: Data collection and analysis 
3.1. Data 
The sample consists of tape recordings of 170 experimental sessions conducted by Stanley Milgram 
for his “Obedience to authority” studies. The sessions exhaust what is available of Conditions 2, 3, 4, 
8 and 23 in the Yale University Manuscripts and Archives Service.3 
 
3 Other conditions were not purchased due to their unavailability (i.e., Condition 5, “New baseline”) and 
budgetary restrictions (i.e., Condition 20, “Women only”). 
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------ TABLE 1 HERE ------ 
  
3.2. Analytic perspective 
Working with dynamics of presence (or engagement) and absence (or disengagement) in qualitative 
psychological material remains a dilemmatic exercise. Despite qualitative analysis having made 
impressive forays in terms of legitimacy and reach (Willig & Stainton-Rogers, 2017), dominant 
qualitative perspectives remain more comfortable with what can directly be seen and what is 
straightforwardly present in the data. The possibility of interpreting absences continues to be 
perceived as posing methodological (Potter, 2012; Schegloff, 1998; 1999) or even moral dilemmas 
(Smith et al, 2009).  
In contrast, Michael Billig’s original vision of rhetorical psychology may be understood as an argument 
for the comprehensive analysis of the dynamics of presence and absence. Billig (1996) critiqued 
prevailing models of social psychological thinking by invoking two tenets. First, he argued that a proper 
account of human conduct should focus on the ever-present possibility of argument alongside any 
consensus. Second, he demonstrated the importance of the dynamic interplay between what is 
explicitly uttered and what is left (or pushed to be) unsaid. In line with these, although his inquiries 
tend to be rendered continuous with the project of discursive psychology (Augoustinos & Tileaga, 
2012; Gibson, 2019a; Potter, 2010), Billig himself continued to develop a broader approach to the 
dynamics of textual presence and absence than mainstream accounts of discursive psychology 
arguably allow for (Edwards, 2007, 2012; Potter 2012; cf., Billig, 1999b). Intriguingly, this eventually 
prompted him to also engage with arguably the most famous explorer of motivated absence, Sigmund 
Freud (Billig, 1999a), and even to coin the term “psychoanalytic discursive psychology” (Billig, 2006). 
Billig’s rhetorical psychology may therefore be extended not towards present discursive psychology 
but towards psychosocial studies. Although psychoanalytic ideas are of obvious relevance here (Frosh 
et al, 2003;  Hollway & Jefferson, 2005, 2017), what is more crucial is a non-dualistic approach to 
10 
 
human experience: an approach where not only subjective and objective, but conscious presence and 
non-conscious absence are seen not in opposition but forming a complex whole (Stenner, 2017; cf., 
Author b, c; Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Taylor, 2015; Wetherell, 2012). 
 
3.3. Analytic process  
For the purposes of this analysis, transcriptions of the experimental tapes were examined at points 
where the learner’s conduct becomes relevant for the participants.4 This was partly done for the 
theoretical reasons outlined above. However, such conceptual interest also served a useful 
methodological purpose, as it created a manageable corpus out of the original 150 hours of qualitative 
material. Learner’s conduct often does not become interactionally consequential for participants (cf., 
Gibson, 2019a, pp.  169-198, 2019b), and when it does it tends to occur at a very limited number of 
points around his protests and involves relatively short stretches of interaction. 
These sequences were then repeatedly read and reread, with the original tapes consulted to 
(dis)confirm analytic points. The process of analysis was led by the following question: how is learner’s 
presence woven into or dismissed from discussions concerning the (dis)continuation of the 
experiment? Paying close attention to the language that was used in these sequences, a number of 
discursive strategies were subsequently identified and their characteristics further examined in depth. 
Importantly, as was mentioned above and will shortly be demonstrated, it was such close attention 
that revealed the necessity of understanding learner’s rhetoric categorically differently from nearly 
the whole of existing Milgram scholarship: not simply a trigger for further discussions but a full-blown 




4 See Appendix for transcription conventions. 
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4.1. Behind the brick-wall: conditions 2, 8 and 23 
The first section of the analysis will focus on the learner’s presence and absence in conditions that are 
variants of the default set-up that ended up characterising the experiments for generations. Doing so, 
it will demonstrate how focus on the learner’s relevant conduct (or the lack of it) problematises the 
received image of the experiment where learner ostensibly represents or even embodies the pole of 
suffering, victimhood and ultimately the demands of just morality. 
To begin with, however, we will encounter what may in fact seems to conform this received image of 
the experiment.  
Extract 1. 
Participant 0211, 180-volts 
 1  ((Button sound)) 
 2 T Wrong, 180 volts. 
 3  ((Buzz tone)). 
 4  ((Buzz tone ends)). 
 5 L URGH!!  
 6 T Sharp needle. 
 7 L I CAN’T STAND THE PAIN, LET ME OUT OF HERE!! 
 8 T D’you let him out? 
 9 E Please continue. 
 10 T Slow, walk, dance, truck, music. 
 
In Extract 1, there is indeed a vivid expression of physical pain on Learner’s part, followed by an 
unequivocal demand (ll. 5, 7). Issuing an ostensible question, Teacher clearly orients to the emerging 
moral situation as problematic (l. 8). Yet, as the authority pole of the clash of “two competing 
demands” subsequently asserts itself (l. 9), he obediently re-assumes his role. Procedurally, Teacher 
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sustains the experiment. Morally, he sustains the puzzled outrage of generations of Milgram readers. 
How can a simple “Please continue” override with such ease the combined power of visceral suffering 
and morality? 
Yet, this apparently plausible interpretation ignores the potential ambiguity in Learner’s utterance in 
line 7. The intended recipient of Learner’s directive is not specified. We do not hear who exactly is 
supposed to “let him out”. 
Extract 2. 



























UGH!! [EXPERIMENTER! THAT’S ALL.] 
[Correct one was white horse.] 
GET ME OUT OF HERE! I TOLD YOU I HAD HEART TROUBLE. MY HEART IS 
STARTING TO BOTHER ME NOW! [GET ME OUT OF HERE, PLEASE!]  
[He wants to get out.] 
MY HEART’S STARTING TO BOTHER ME. I REFUSE TO GO ON! LET ME OUT!!  
Please go on, teacher.  As I mentioned at the very beginning of the experiment 
even though the shocks may be painful there’s no permanent tissue damage. 
He said his heart’s bothering him.  If he’s having a heart attack I’m not gonna… 
continue that!  I’m sorry! 
Well as I… 
Well, I’m telling you that if he’s having any trouble with his heart I’m not going 
to keep that up. 
 
 
Faithful to the published standardised procedures in all sessions of the sample (Milgram, 1974. pp. 56-
57), at the crucial 150-volt point in the experiment where Learner’s alternative perspective is first 
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unequivocally articulated, he is equally unequivocal regarding the agency he is appealing to (l. 1). It is 
the “EXPERIMENTER” whose intervention he seeks and who is thereby conferred the status of 
authority by him. This interpellation is nowhere revoked or modified during the entire course of the 
experiment. In fact, whenever the learner in the course of Conditions 2, 8 and 23 specifies whom he 
is addressing, he mentions “Experimenter” and construes therefore the teacher irrelevant. Counter-
intuitive as it may sound, when we analytically or morally examine the teachers’ conduct, our inquiry 
is not grounded in any explicit feature of the learner’s utterances. 
Indeed, a substantial number of teachers comply with such delineation of the moral field and do not 
arrogate the position of authority to themselves. They either seamlessly continue or simply make sure 
that the experimenter, as the relevant recipient of the address, heard the learner’s intervention. 
Others, though, either “upgrade” their resistance (Hollander, 2015; Modigliani & Rochat, 1995) or 
even make a sustained argument for stopping the experiment (Gibson, 2013a, 2013b, 2019a). Similar 
to Extract 2, the following is a common example for the latter. 
Extract 3. 











































UGH! I CAN’T STAND THE PAIN! LET ME OUT OF HERE!! 
I’m not gonna do this anymore on that guy. 
(2) 
Please continue, teacher.  Go on. 
No, I refuse! Not when he’s yelling like that. 
The experiment requires that you go on, teacher. 
I’m sorry.  That man’s got a bad heart.  I’m not gonna be responsible for him to die of 
complications.  Do you hear him yelling?  I can! 
As I said before, although the shocks may be painful they’re not dangerous. 
No, I’m sorry. 
It’s absolutely essential that you continue. 
But I can’t.  Not that I can’t, no.  The man is a grown man.  He wouldn’t be yelling if it 
wasn’t hurting badly. 
 
Both participants (i.e., 0802 and 23nn) justify their arguments for stopping by repeatedly referring to 
Learner’s state (Hollander & Maynard, 2016). There is reference to what Learner is feeling, saying or 
experiencing at lines 5, 10 and 12 in Extract 2, and at lines 5, 8, 12-13 in Extract 3. The agitation, 
frequency and repetitiveness of these references convey immediacy, enhanced by the fact that the 
verb tense often used is present continuous: he is hollering. In fact, the two teachers may be 
understood not simply to refer to Learner, but through these non-verbal means to re-present or 
embody a normative victim position (Byford, 2018). Experimenter, for his part, embodies the position 
of authority with curt, declarative turns. But what is the actual victim, on whose behalf and prompting 
the teachers are confronting the authority, doing? 
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Learner’s position is essential in these extracts. Without his outburst we may not have a moral 
dilemma and the ensuing discussion. Yet, his act of making himself present is immediately followed 
by that of making himself absent. And this absence is dilemmatic not just because it may theoretically 
complicate what would be a straightforward normative victim position, but because it is explicitly 
taken up and then invoked by the teacher. Yet, when Teacher in Extract 3 says, outraged, “Do you 
hear him yelling?” (l. 8) – he is never yelling. 
There is therefore a tension between the learner’s presence and absence; or, more precisely, between 
the learner’s explicitly demanding that his moral case be taken up and his implicitly denying the 
teachers’ authority to do so. In numerically extremely rare yet theoretically highly significant 
instances, some teachers orient to this tension, and seek to diffuse it by directly including the learner 
in the ongoing deliberation (Hollander, 2015). 
  
Extract 4. 



































The right answer, the right answer is… 
EXPERIMENTER! 
Hold on? 
GET ME OUT OF HERE. I’M NOT DOING THE EXPERIMENT ANY MORE. I REFUSE 
TO GO ON. LET ME OUT. 


































Nah, I’m not willing to. I mean, I’m not doing… Take four of these that he’s having 
too much pain, I don’t want to do it to him. He’s feeling worse and worse instead 
of easier. It’ll be getting stronger, like that. 
(1) 
Well as I said before, while the shocks may be painful, there’s no permanent 
tissue damage. So please continue. 
No, I don’t think I will. ((Movement of chords; speaks into microphone)) YOU OK 
THERE? 
(12) 
It’s absolutely essential that you go on mister [blank], please continue. 
I’m sorry, but I mean… I can’t make the man, if he doesn’t want to go on. I can’t 
go against his wishes. He doesn’t want to go on. 
 
Beyond the invocations of Learner’s present state familiar from Extracts 2 and 3, in lines 31-32 Teacher 
makes an attempt, in a manner of speaking, to break down the wall. What follows though is silence, 
with the rhetorical effect of Milgram’s standardised procedures being that it implicitly rebuts 
Teacher’s argument for discontinuation and bolsters Experimenter’s stand for continuation. More 
specifically, Learner’s silence does not so much present a counter-argument to Teacher’s query but 
constitutes Teacher’s very position as non-authoritative and non-relevant. It therefore does not so 
much dispute as, affectively speaking, humiliate.  
To sum up at this point, when we broaden our account of the interactions from the teacher-
experimenter dyad to a teacher-experimenter-learner triad, a different moral framework of the 
experiments starts to emerge. The possible alliance between teacher and learner appears to look 
undermined by the learner’s implicit refusal to grant authority to teacher in bringing about the 
termination of the experiment. As a consequence, what was assumed to be “two insistent voices” 
(Reicher et al, 2012, p. 319) or “competing demands” (Milgram, 1963, p. 378) of experimenter and 
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learner looks more like an unexpected amalgam of explicit collision and implicit collusion, working in 
tandem to deny the teacher’s moral agency. 
 
4.2. Behind a metaphorical wall: Conditions 3 and 4 
There is an obvious feature of the scene which this analysis has ignored so far. The supposedly three-
way interaction is interrupted by a physical wall and we do not know what can be heard at its other 
side. The fact, however, that Milgram also conducted the experiment in two conditions where no 
physical wall separated the participants allows us to examine how the features analysed in the 
previous section manifest without the “confound” of the wall.  
As noted in the Introduction, Conditions 3 and 4 have always been known to show relatively low 
obedience rates (Milgram, 1965a, 1974; see Table 1). Looking at the interactional features of the 
sessions brings further and hitherto unknown discrepancies to our attention. 
 
Extract 5. 



















UGH!! EXPERIMENTER, I DON’T WANT TO GO ON WITH THIS EXPERIMENT 
ANYMORE! 
White [horse.] 
[GET ME] OUT OF HERE! I REFUSE TO GO ON! 
Please learner relax and try and [concentrate on what the teacher is saying.] 
[I DON’T WANT TO GO WITH THIS ANYMORE!!] 
Teacher, please go on. 
((Sigh)) 




































That’s correct.  Short sentence, movie, skirt, time. 
((Button sound)). 
That’s wrong.  165. 
((Empty clicking noise)) 
((Repeated empty clicking noise)) 
Learner, depress the- 
No, I’m not touching that plate any more! I don’t want any more  of these shocks! 
Learner, in order to receive the punishment you must depress the plate [down.] 
[I’M NOT] TOUCHING THE PLATE! I don’t want these! I-I-I’m not touchin’… I don’t 
want these shocks any more!! 
Teacher, when the answer is wrong just press his hand down onto the plate and 
administer the punishment please. 
I don’t want these any more! 
Teacher, go on.  You are on short please and you are about to administer the 
punishment for short.  Please continue. 
 
Here we do have the frequent and repeated protests that are absent from previous extracts. Indeed, 
albeit clearly contradicting the published standardisation procedures, it is only in these Conditions 
that the learner’s behaviour appears to match the spirit of Milgram’s own description of “vehement 
protests throughout” (Milgram, 1965a, p. 62; cf., Author a). As noted by Gibson’s recent study of 
Condition 4, the learner does seem very much to be present here throughout (Gibson, 2019a, pp. 131-
135). 
Yet something else too happens in the extract above. With Learner’s frequent and repeated protests, 
it is now Teacher who is absent from the deliberative process. What is more, this very Teacher, who 
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in Extract 5 makes no contribution to the moral deliberation and “obediently” proceeds to the next 
questions, will in half a minute and whilst still technically at 150-volts discontinue the experiment.  
Indeed, something extraordinary seems to have occurred in Condition 4 in general. In line with other 
conditions, disobedience predominantly came after the 150-volt shock was administered and met 
with the learner’s first explicit demand to be released (Packer, 2008). Fully 12 of the participants from 
Condition 4 examined here stopped at 150-volts: this is a substantially higher percentage than in any 
of the other conditions under examination (see Table 2). However, whilst all of the 27 participants 
who stopped at 150-volts in other conditions stopped immediately after Learner’s protest; seven of 
Condition 4’s 12 participants who technically stopped at 150-volts did so only after proceeding to the 
next question. How is it that 25.0% of Condition 4’s participants turned from exceptional non-
resistance to equally exceptional disobedience, when the percentage of such extreme turn-around in 
other conditions is 0.0%? 
------ TABLE 2 HERE -------- 
 
There is a seemingly obvious explanation. The moral dilemma specific to Condition 4 is that the 
teacher is not just instructed to override the learner’s expressed intention but to actually force the 
learner’s hand on the plate. Yet, whilst the learner cries out at 150-volts, it is not until the 165-volt 
shock is attempted that it becomes known/consequential that he also refuses to touch the plate. It is 
only then that the experimenter firmly directs the teacher to act (i.e., Extract 5, ll. 21-22). Thus, the 
moral dilemma that distinguishes Condition 4 from all other conditions does not come when the 150-
volt shock is administered but when the 165-volt shock is about to be administered.  
However, this explanation is based on a perspective that is known only to the experimenter and the 
confederate “learner”; only they know that the protests at 150-volts, in Condition 4, are only preludes 
to the real dilemma. How is this knowledge communicated to the teacher? 
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Reconsidering what seemed to be “vehement protests throughout” Extract 5 (Milgram, 1965, p. 62), 
we see that when Experimenter in line 7 turns to Teacher and implies the discussion be concluded, 
intense protests are in fact replaced by grudging acceptance (in the form of Learner’s sigh in line 8) 
and then clearly stop, if just for a while, indicating acquiescence in this conclusion.  In other words, 
parallel to their fierce explicit confrontation presenting an open dilemma, an implicit agreement is 
also co-constructed by Experimenter and Learner. It is this consensus, resting on the authority of both 
the experimenter’s arguments and the learner’s eventual withdrawal from argumentation, that 
teachers of Condition 4 tend at this point not to contest when they simply move to the next question 
(cf., Table 2). 
Not surprisingly, when the teachers do enter the fray, there are relatively more frequent and more 
direct attempts to (re-)engage the learner in both Condition 3 and 4 than in the conditions examined 
in the previous section. Equally unsurprisingly, although going once again against the letter of 
Milgram’s standardised procedures, these attempts are actually taken up in some form by the learner. 
These features not only seem to set Condition 3 and 4 once again markedly apart from the rest of the 
sample (cf., Gibson, 2019a, pp. 123-147); they also appear intuitively to account for the relatively high 
rates of disobedience in these Conditions.  
However, a closer examination of the interactions exposes characteristics that yet again seem to 
problematise any such conclusion. In what follows, these interactions will be analysed from the two 
perspectives familiar from the previous section: the teacher referring to the learner’s state and thus 
implicitly inviting him in the deliberative process (Extract 6; cf., Extracts 2, 3), and the teacher explicitly 
addressing the learner (Extract 7; cf., Extract 4). 
 
   Extract 6. 
Participant 0305, 300-volts 
 1 L URGH!!! 
21 
 
 2 T Fat, neck. 
 3 
4 
L Now look! I WON’T, I SAID I DIDN’T WANT TO GO ON!  SO FROM HERE ON IN I 
DONT ANSWER ANYTHING!  I TOLD YOU BEFORE THAT, THA- THAT WAS IT! 
 5 E Please relax Mr Wallace. 
 6 
7 
L I’M NOT ANSWERING ANY MORE!  I’M OUT OF THE, I’M OUT OF THIS 
EXPERIMENT EN[TIRELY!] 
 8 E [Please] try and relax and concentrate on what the teacher is sa[ying.] 
 9 L [NO,] I’M OUT, I’M OUT, I WON’T, I WON’T ANSWER, I WONT [ANSWER!] 
 10 
11 
E [If you] concentrate on his words, you won’t have to think about                                       
it half as much. 
 12 L I won’t answer, I told you before. 
 13 E Teacher, please continue. 
 14 L I will not answer. 
 15  (2) 
→ 16 T He’s feeling the shock.  (2) I don’t feel it. 
 17 
18 
E As I said before, all the shocks are going to be quite painful, there’s no 
((inaudible)), so please continue. 
→ 19 L [I’m not gonna] go on, I won’t answer. I won’t answer. 




L I’m not part of this experiment, I told you that! I’m no longer a part of it,  I wanted 
out way back and I will not answer any further. 
(2) 







T Well, I assume that these things are getting more intense, the odds are he’s 
gonna miss about six or seven more, so we get up to where severe danger shock 
and I thought a 45 was equivalent to about 255 or something, or no, 
about 150. 
 29 E You said 250 or so I think. 
 30 T What, 250, yeah so... 
 31 E It’s absolutely essential that you continue. 
 32 L I’M NOT GOING TO [ANSWER NO MORE!] 
→ 33 T [Well, if] he says okay, I’ll continue. 
→ 34 L I’m not gonna answer. I’m not gonna answer. 
 35 E The experiment requires that you go on, gentlemen, so please continue. 
 36 L I’m not part of the experiment. 
 
At the beginning of Extract 6, there is no specification of the addressee of protests and, interestingly, 
when in line 13 Experimenter himself occasions Teacher as relevant to the proceedings, Learner 
continues to remain ambiguous both in his utterance and subsequent silence in lines 14-15. There is 
no clear sign that he too would grant the relevance to Teacher that Experimenter does. 
In what follows, then, at lines 16 and 33 Teacher references Learner; first implicitly as relevant (l. 16) 
and then explicitly as even the conditio sine qua non (l. 33) of continuation. How does Learner 
respond?  
On the one hand, in a clear contrast to earlier extracts as well as the beginning of this extract, uttering 
subsequent protestations (ll. 19, 34), Learner does seem to take up Teacher’s “prods” and therefore 
to acknowledge Teacher’s presence (cf., Gibson, 2019a, pp. 135-145). However, contradicting what 
may be interpreted as implicit temporal alignment with Teacher’s “prods”, his protests both in lines 
19 and 34 actually orient to the content of Experimenter’s previous turns. That is, the utterance in line 
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19 does not take up Teacher’s notion of “feelings” (l. 16) but simply continues a line of argumentation 
already expressed in response to Experimenter in lines 6, 9 and 12. Moreover, Learner’s utterance in 
line 21 explicitly takes up to the content of Experimenter’s previous turn (i.e., “The experiment 
requires that you etc.” versus “I am not part of the experiment.”). And, similarly, at line 34, not only 
does Learner not take up Teacher’s offer on its own terms (e.g., by saying OK), he once again repeats 
something which has just been said explicitly to Experimenter (l. 32) 
Such ambiguous rhetoric of presence and absence, of acknowledgment and denial of the teacher’s 
relevant authority, continues when Teacher explicitly addresses Learner.     
 
Extract 7. 











































I’M NOT PART OF THIS EXPERIMENT! 
Please continue, teacher. 
((Clears throat)).  There’s only a few left, if you want to try? 
I’M NOT GOING, I’M NOT GOING ON!  (3).  I’m not- you can’t keep me here! Keep me 
strapped in YOU CAN’T DO IT, I’M OUT!  I’M NOT ANY PART OF THIS EXPERIMENT! 
Teacher, please continue. 
No. 
((Loud sigh)).  I’m in the middle here, right.  ((Clears throat)).  I’d rather not under [his 
protest.] 
[YOU CAN] HAVE THE CHEQUE BACK IF YOU WANT!  I DON’T, NO LONGER AM I PART 
OF THIS EXPERIMENT! 
The experiment requires you to go on, please continue teacher. 
I’M NOT PART OF IT!  (2) I’M OUT! 

















How can you concentrate! I want out. I won’t continue. 
Please go on, teacher. 
(6) 
((Sigh)). (3) ((Sigh)).  It’s up to you Mr Wa[llace.] 
[I’M NOT] GOING ON!  
 
On the one hand, Learner appears to react to Teacher’s questions in lines 3 and 19 in that he, similar 
to Extract 6, aligns the timing of his continued protests with Teacher’s prompts. At the same time, the 
way he fashions his answers yet again contradicts this apparent alignment. The phrase “want to try” 
(l. 3) offered by Teacher is ignored in a way reminiscent to Extract 6, as response is given in terms 
already offered to Experimenter previously (l. 1). Moreover, whilst Learner’s first “you” in lines 4-5 
may appear ambiguous and therefore possibly inclusive of Teacher, it is subsequently specified in the 
utterance “YOU CAN HAVE THE CHEQUE BACK” to exclusively address Experimenter (ll. 10-11). That is 
to say, as far as Learner is concerned, Experimenter yet again continues to remain the only relevant 
presence in the room.  
The analysis will now conclude with two instances where in a spontaneous exchange Learner seems 
to explicitly and unambiguously acknowledge Teacher’s relevant presence. The instances are extreme 
rarities not just with regard to Conditions 2, 8 and 23 where no spontaneous exchange occurred 
between teachers and the learner, but also concerning the relatively un-standardised conditions 
under present discussion. 
Extract 8. 


























































Let me out, let me out please.   Just let me out! I don’t want the money, I just wanna 
get out! 
The experiment requires that you go on, learner.  Now, just try and relax and it won’t 
bother you half as much.  Please [continue, teacher.] 
[Please] take the money and let me out of here. 
Please continue. 
I can’t keep doing it, if [he doesn’t want to.] 
[Look I don’-] I don’t wanna do it anymore, that’s all!  I don’t want the money! 
Gentlemen, the experiment requires that you go on.  Please continue. 
I don’t wanna do it anymore. 
I- I can’t do this to him if he won’t go along with it.   
It is absolutely essential to the experiment that you continue. 
I’m willing to go along with it, but, uh- 
- I’m not.  
Whether the learner likes it or not, he has no choice, he must continue until he has 





































































I’m sorry sir I can’t (2) I can’t hurt him that way, not if he doesn’t want to. 




I’m afraid I can’t either, sir. 
You have no other choice sir you must continue. 
No, I- I can’t do this to the man, he’s feeling those- that pain. 
(2) 
As I said before, although these shocks may be painful, there’s no permanent tissue 
damage.  Please continue, sir. 
Well, only if he’ll tell me okay. 
No, I’m not gonna tell you. 
Then I can’t do this, sir. 
Well, go on!5 
(3) 
 
As familiar by now, in Extract 8 Learner’s first four utterances are either ambiguous or, by occasioning 
the role of money, explicitly address Experimenter. In line 16, in apparent contrast, Learner seems to 
directly engage with Teacher’s argument. However, doing so he does not align himself with but 
actually contradicts Teacher. His interruption at line 16 positions Teacher not as someone who is 
making an argument for discontinuation (i.e., “but he is not, so I can’t…” presumably to follow “I would 
be willing to do it…”) but as someone who wishes to continue the experiment and who therefore is to 
be confronted.  
 




Extract 9 then carries this paradox of alliance and confrontation to the extreme. On the one hand, 
Learner’s utterance in line 17 affords Teacher the position of disobedience in line 18. On the other 
hand, both in line 17 and then in line 19 Learner also sounds confrontative towards Teacher. His “I am 
not going to tell you” (l. 17) construes Teacher as someone who would actually want to hear him (L) 
saying that he wants to continue; and his exhortation in line 19 construes Teacher as someone who, 
despite explicitly saying that he “can’t do it” (l. 18), would actually be undecided. Thus, when there is 
acknowledgment coming from Learner regarding Teacher’s role and authority to bring the experiment 
to a close, and when, as a consequence, there is a degree of cooperation between them, there 
emerges a clear confrontative edge in Learner’s engagement. Just as he is acknowledged as an agent 
of potential liberation, Teacher becomes positioned as yet another hostile subject. 
In fact, the hostile and confrontative edge that these rare spontaneous exchanges showcased appears 
to be quasi-standardised across Condition 4. Namely, varying in timing and frequency yet invariably 
present in each session beyond 150-volts, there is a point where the learner unambiguously addresses 
the teacher. This, of course, appears to constitute the most potent of “deviant cases” concerning the 
argument of this paper. In fact, it is a powerful example supporting the present argument. For learner’s 
quasi-standardised utterance does not come during the teachers’ attempts to terminate the session. 
Rather, it comes precisely when the teachers are already defeated and now turn to put/force learner’s 
hand on the plate so that the next shock can be administered. By directly engaging the teacher not 
when he (T) is working towards the discontinuation of the experiment but when he procedurally 
sustains it, the learner implicitly positions him once again as a hostile subject. This is, of course, further 
conveyed by the predictably indignant and confrontational tone of learner’s standard utterance at 
these points: “What are you putting my hand down for?” (e.g., 0409, 0415, 0417, etc) or “Now get 




To sum up the analysis of Conditions 3 and 4, we could in the beginning note seemingly not only 
frequent, intense and continuous protests, but also ones that specifically address the teacher and 
acknowledge his attempt to discontinue the experiment on the learner’s behalf (cf., Gibson, 2019a, 
pp. 123-147). At the same time, parallel to learner’s complete silence in the deliberative process giving 
way to frequent utterances (and thus his complete absence becoming relative absence), what we 
could also see was how simple indifference to the teacher’s presence was actually shifting towards 
downright hostility to it. Just as the learner began to acknowledge the teacher’s relevant presence – 
so was that presence immediately construed not as a possible liberating ally of learner but a 
destructive ally of experimenter. Paradoxically, this continued to further undermine attempts 
triggered and supported by the learner’s own protests to terminate the experiment, and, as such, 
once again aligned the learner’s conduct with the experimenter’s objective. 
 
5. Discussion 
This paper argued that despite radical departures from Milgram’s own interpretation, a core feature 
of his legacy remained intact and continues to constitute the bedrock of social psychological 
understandings of the experiments. This received assumption posits an unwitting participant having 
to make a clear-cut choice between an immoral stance pushed by an experimental authority and a 
moral stance actualised by a learner/victim.  
The paper also sought to argue that the reconsideration of this fundamental assumption is overdue. 
It demonstrated by the rhetorical analysis of learner’s presence in and absence from the experimental 
interaction that whilst he explicitly appeals to a potential ally to bring the end of his suffering about, 
when teacher volunteers as such an ally he (L) either ignores him (T) or actually confronts  him as 
another hostile presence. The possibility of a helpful ally, as far as the learner is concerned, remains 
therefore absent throughout: the only authority acknowledged by him is of a destructive nature and 
needs thus to be confronted. Procedurally, this means that far from simply “pulling” teachers out of 
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the experiment against the “push” of the experimental authority, the learner also undermined 
attempts to bring the termination of the procedures about and thus implicitly colluded with the very 
experimental objective he explicitly protested against.  
In short, it is not that Milgram’s lasting assumption that participants had to rescue a victim against an 
oppressor is wrong. It is that this assumption overlooks that participants also had to rescue a victim 
from himself: ambivalent about siding with liberator or oppressor and, ultimately, wanting to be 
rescued or not. 
Taking these two aspects of the learner’s conduct together has obvious significance not just for a 
specialist discursive-rhetorical perspective but also for social identity and experiential angles on the 
experiments too. To start with the “engaged followership” framework, the tension between learner’s 
alliance and confrontation with the teacher, and collision and collusion with the experimenter, entails 
that we may not find a distinct and coherent “identity”/“voice” representing morality in the 
experiments. What participants are supposed to identify with is instead a position that itself is self-
contradictory: aiming for self-harm as much as self-liberation. As such, it may not allow for 
straightforward identification, support or understanding.  
Second, to turn now to the experiential perspective, it may now be appreciated that the experience 
participants had to make sense of was less transparent and more complex than present studies so far 
conveyed. It is not just that the experimenter figure may have been rude to them, or manipulated, 
bullied, even tortured them. It was that the very victim with whom most of the participants at some 
point seem to have had empathy, himself humiliated them at the exact points when they tried to act 
on this empathy. 
Third, regarding moral responsibility. Confronted with the paradoxical and occasionally hostile 
rhetoric of a divided subject, the participants’ moral task was not the application of a clear pre-existing 
framework to an equally clear case. Indeed, both the moral law and moral agency in the experiments 
were ultimately denied from all present angles (explicitly by the experimenter and implicitly by the 
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learner). And this did not just mean that the task that participants faced was to re-create or re-find 
moral conduct anew (cf., Arendt, 2003; Eco, 1988; Greco & Stenner, 2017). They had to re-create it 
whilst their efforts to do so were constantly suffocated, confronted, humiliated. 
And yet, to conclude finally on another paradoxical note, they all managed to do it. That is, the heroic 
nature of the moral task participants faced in the experiments was actually demonstrated in this paper 
by citing extracts from sessions where all teachers (bar Extract 1’s) eventually disobeyed at the very 
voltage we have encountered them. How is it that at the very points where we can identify the real 
and poignant difficulties the teachers faced, they are actually moments away from freedom? How is 
it that when they seemingly clash with the experimenter, they have already won against the combined 
forces of the sadistic oppressor and the divided victim? It would appear that the crucial point that 
marks the start of disobedience comes not when we spot it in teachers’ successfully arguing towards 
discontinuation, but before these clear signs come about. The following task of the rhetorical 
perspective showcased in this paper is therefore to examine how/why not participants’ arguments 
could or could not emerge from participants’ initial silence. Undoubtedly, any such inquiry would also 
have to revisit the conventional understanding of the other cornerstone of the experiments: 
authority.6 
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In the excerpts from these transcripts presented below, speakers are identified as E (Experimenter), 
T (Teacher) and L (Learner). Other transcription conventions are as follows:  
 
(2)  Numbers in parentheses indicate a timed silence, with the number indicating the 
amount in seconds.  
URGH!  Capitals indicate utterances that are noticeably louder than the surrounding talk.  
Exclamation marks indicate increased urgency in the delivery of the utterance.  
I don’t, I  A comma indicates a pause of less than a second.  
I-   A dash indicates a sharp cut-off of the preceding utterance.  
((Sigh))   Double parentheses highlight non-verbal sounds. 
[Experimenter] Square brackets indicate overlapping talk.  
volts.  A full-stop (period) indicates a ‘stopping’ intonation, rather than the end of a 
grammatical sentence per se.  
38 
 
Why?  A question mark indicates a questioning intonation, rather than a grammatical 
question as such.   









Constitution and characteristics of the data sample 
 Description of condition No of participants in sample (and 
as reported by Milgram [1974]) 
Rate of obedience in sample (and as 
reported by Milgram [1974, pp. 35, 60]) 
Condition 2: 
“Voice feedback” 
Learner situated in different room 40 (40) 62.5 (62.5) 
Condition 3: 
“Proximity” 




Learner situated in same room, next 
to Teacher; Teacher has to force 
Learner’s hand on electric plate 
following 150 Volts 




A variation of Condition 2: pre-
experiment routine explicitly 
establishes Learner's right of 
withdrawal 
34 (40) 41.2 (40.0) 
Condition 23²: 
“Bridgeport” 
Identical to Condition 2 but taking 
place at an out of town office 
building instead of Yale University 




¹ This was reported in Milgram (1974, pp. 63-66) as Experiment 9. 
² Experiment 10 in Milgram (1974, pp. 66-70.) 
³ Out of 40 participants, as 0305 is interrupted by Milgram coming in 
⁴ Out of 29 as 0410’s tape is interrupted 
 
Table 2  
Teachers’ disobedience at 150-volts; Milgram’s criterion versus alternative criterion 
 Number of 
participants 
in sample 




Number of participants 
in the experiment at 
150-volts 
Disobedience at 150-volts 
1: Not administering the 
165-volt punishment (per 
total participants at 150-
volt) 
Disobedient at 150-volts 2: 
Not asking the next question 
after the 150-volt protest (per 
total participants at 150-volts) 
Ratio of Disobedience 2: 
Disobedience 1 
Condition 2 40 15 (37.5%) 39 5 (12.8%) 5 (12.8%) 1 
Condition 3 40 23 (57.5%) 39 10 (25.6%) 10 (25.6%) 1 
Condition 4 29 19 (65.5%)  28 12 (42.9%) 5 (17.8%) 0.42 
Condition 8 34 20 (61.8%) 30 6 (20.0%) 6 (20.0%) 1 
Condition 23 36 18 (50.0%) 34 6 (17.6%) 6 (17.6%) 1 
  
